follow CCP

Recent blog entries
popular papers

Science Curiosity and Political Information Processing

What Is the "Science of Science Communication"?

Climate-Science Communication and the Measurement Problem

Ideology, Motivated Cognition, and Cognitive Reflection: An Experimental Study

'Ideology' or 'Situation Sense'? An Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment

A Risky Science Communication Environment for Vaccines

Motivated Numeracy and Enlightened Self-Government

Making Climate Science Communication Evidence-based—All the Way Down 

Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law 

Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus

The Tragedy of the Risk-Perception Commons: Science Literacy and Climate Change

"They Saw a Protest": Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction 

Geoengineering and the Science Communication Environment: a Cross-Cultural Experiment

Fixing the Communications Failure

Why We Are Poles Apart on Climate Change

The Cognitively Illiberal State 

Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, Who Doesn't, and Why? An Experimental Study

Cultural Cognition of the Risks and Benefits of Nanotechnology

Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? An Empirical Examination of Scott v. Harris

Cultural Cognition and Public Policy

Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in "Acquaintance Rape" Cases

Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White Male Effect

Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk

Cultural Cognition as a Conception of the Cultural Theory of Risk

« Mooney's revenge?! Is there "asymmetry" in Motivated Numeracy? | Main | Well, things are going slowly in the kitchen, so here's another "vaccine risk perception" appetizer -- on the house »

Knowledge is not scary; being *afraid to know* is

Andrew Revkin directed me and a collection of others to a very well-done talk he gave on the state of social science research on climate-science communication. The subject line of the email was "the scariest climate science is the social science..." Well, that didn't match at all the message of AR's column or his talk. But it did what he likely intended, which was provoke me (likely other recipients will be provoked too) to respond the suggestion that there is something "scary" -- or maybe "hopeless" -- about the sort of research that I and others with whom I'm in scholarly conversation do. That idea is out there, not in Andy's remarks but in the attitudes of many people who are worried about the state of public engagement with climate science, & is dead wrong. Here is what I said:

I see nothing scary in the state of the research on the dynamics of public conflict on climate change.

The scary thing would be not knowing which of the various plausible dynamics that could be generating persistent public conflict over climate science really are doing so, and to what extent. There are more plausible candidates--plausible because rooted in valid insight on the mechanisms of risk perceptions-- then can be true. Only empirical investigation can help to winnow down the possibilities (steer us clear of endless story-telling) and focus attention on the most consequential, most tractable sources of the failure of reasoning people to converge on the best available evidence (as they normally do; the number of matters addressed by decision-relevant science on which see conflict of this sort relative to the number in which we don't is minuscule, albeit fraught w/ significance).

But that is the point of doing such research: to figure out what is really going on, so that genuinely responsive strategies for promoting open-minded and constructive public engagement can be fashioned. I believe that we now know a tremendous amount about the sources of persistent public conflict over decision-relevant science thanks to empirical research on risk perception and communication amassed over the course of over three decades.

It is precisely b/c of that work, and the systematic application of it to problems involving climate science communication, that we are now in a position to form sensible hypotheses about what sorts of processes might neutralize the dynamics in question. Using the same methods that have helped to generate a more focused picture of what the problem really is, we can enlarge our understanding of how to remove the conditions that are disabling ordinary people from using their ordinarily reliable faculties for recognizing what's known to science.

But we will have to use the same methods: disciplined, structured observation and inference. There are more plausible accounts of what might work to fix the problem than can be true too.

So we must do more empirical study, and do it, I think, primarily in the field. Social scientists should collaborate with experienced communicators who can identify using their situation sense what sorts of interventions in the real-world might reproduce in their real-world settings the sorts of positive results that people have observed in lab studies. The latter have more reliable, more informed insights on that than the former; but the former can help the latter, both by sharing with them what is known as a result of empirical inquiry into science communication and by enabling these real-world communicators to collect and evaluate evidence of what really works and what doesn't -- and then to tell others about it, so they can use that knowledge, too, and build on it.

I don't think we should be scared by what we have learned about the disabling effect of a polluted science communication environment on our capacity to engage in collective reason.

That some people might be afraid of this--because it shows, say, that they have made mistakes in the past, or that the world doesn't work as they might wish that it does-- is much more frightening, for they are likely to cling in a determined, fearful, ineffectual way to mistaken understandings.

So far from making us afraid, the vast amount we have learned should make us confident that we can use our collective reason, guided by disciplined methods of empirical observation and inference, to repair the deliberative environment on which enlightened self-government depends and indeed to protect it from such degradation in the future.

PrintView Printer Friendly Version

EmailEmail Article to Friend

Reader Comments (4)

I don't think Andrew was saying the science itself was scary, I would guess he was saying he was scared by its implication, that the disagreement is not going to be resolved by scientific/rational discussion and what that means for the prospects for action on climate. (Looking at it from his point of view of assuming that action on climate is the policy that a rational/scientific discussion would lead to, and that it is the failure to persuade that is blocking action.)

The problem with the social science - from the point of view of a partisan advocate - is that while it has shown the current approaches to be ineffective, it hasn't yet come up with any definitive answers on defusing the opposing partisan meanings that stop their message persuading people. It says: your methods won't work, but we have nothing better to offer yet. You may say there is hope of developing one, and that recognising the problem is the first step to solving it, but you haven't solved it yet. And advocates naturally have a concern that they're not going to be able to develop one in time, if at all. The campaign may fail, for reasons of social psychology. That's what's scary.

What I think ought to scare them about it is the implication it has that motivated reasoning is symmetric, and what if they turn out to have been the ones subject to it themselves? What if they turn out to have been wrong? The science is saying that everyone's judgement is disabled on this, because everyone has a cultural investment in reaching the right conclusion. This branch of social science is usually applied asymmetrically as a partisan weapon - the Republican Brain and so on - but that's not what the science says. The personal consequences, given that same cultural investment, should it all turn out to have actually been a case of 'The Democrat Brain' are themselves scary. That is, after all, precisely what is 'motivating' about it.

I doubt that is what Andrew meant, but it is another way of looking at it.

October 6, 2013 | Unregistered CommenterNiV


definitely true. And I wasn't thinking of him either in reflecting on who is scared to know things -- & how scared we should be of *them*

October 6, 2013 | Unregistered Commenterdmk38

Looking at the comments, I don't think many on either side appreciate science. YMMV.

October 7, 2013 | Unregistered CommenterJohn F. Pittman

Why it is scary... It is a result of the criminal brain. We have never left our animal nature. Those that believe in anything are being used by those beliefs. Belief is just a tool. Paradox allows us to believe in multiple truths. The only best interest is the indaviduals best interest. The experament is over and we are now returning to the functional state of tyranny. Science is Santa. Realism is might. If you believe you are getting somthing for behaving then you behave. If you believe you are getting somthing if you don't get caught misbehaving you are cunning. Do not believe in anything and you are looking for what you want on your own and no one controls you.
Hope is the worst lie. It leaves you waiting for results when there are none. Play D&D and read a text book. It's all role play for monkeys😂

January 9, 2015 | Unregistered CommenterNvrdeadned

PostPost a New Comment

Enter your information below to add a new comment.

My response is on my own website »
Author Email (optional):
Author URL (optional):
Some HTML allowed: <a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <code> <em> <i> <strike> <strong>