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« Weekend update: modeling the impact of the "according to climate scientists prefix" on identity-expressive vs. science-knowledge revealing responses to climate science literacy items | Main | "America's two climate changes ..." & how science communicators should/shouldn't address them ... today in Burlington, VT »

Toggling the switch between cognitive engagement with "America's two climate changes"--not so hard in *the lab*

So I had a blast last night talking about “America’s 2 climate changes” at the 14 Annual “Climate Predication Applications Workshop,” hosted by NOAA’s National Weather Service Climate Services Branch, in Burlington Vermont (slides here).

It’s really great when after a 45-minute talk (delivered in a record-breaking 75 mins) a science-communication professional stands up & crystallizes your remarks in a 15-second summary that makes even you form a clearer view of what you are trying to say! Thanks, David Herring!

In sum, the “2 climate changes” thesis is that there are two ways in which people engage information about climate change in America: to express who they are as members of groups for whom opposing positions on the issue are badges of membership in one or another competing cultural group; and to make sense of scientific information that is relevant to doing things of practical importantance—from being a successful farmer to protecting their communities from threats to vital natural resources to exploiting distinctive commercial opportunities—that are affected by how climate is changing as a result of the influence of humans on the environment.

I went through various sorts of evidence—including what Kentucky Farmer has to say about “believing in climate change” when he is in his living room versus when he is on his tractor.

Also the inspired leadership in Southeast Florida, which has managed to ban conversation of the “climate change” that puts the question “who are you, whose side are you on?” in order to enable conversation of the “climate change” which asks “what do we know, what should we do?”

But I also featured some experimental data that helped to show how one can elicit one or the other climate change in ordinary study respondents.

The data came from the study (mentioned a few times in previous entries) that CCP and the Annenberg Public Policy Center conducted to refine the Ordinary Climate Science Intelligence assessment (“OSI_1.0”).  

OSI_1.0 used a trick from the study of public comprehension of evolutionary science to “unconfound” the measurement of “knowledge” and “identity.” 

It’s well established that there is no correlation between the answer survey respondents give to questions about their belief in (acceptance of) human evolution and what they understand about science in general or evolutionary science in particular. No matter how much or little individuals understand about science’s account of the natural history of human beings, those who have a cultural identity that features religiosity answer “false” to the statement “human beings evolved from an earlier species of animals,” and those who have a cultural identity that doesn’t  say “true.”  

But things change when one adds the  prefix “according to the theory of evolution” to the standard true-false survey item:

At that point, religious individuals who manifest their identity-expressive disbelief in evolution by answering “false” can now reveal they are in fact familiar with science’s account of the natural history of human beings (even if they, like the vast majority of those who answer “true” with or without the prefix, couldn’t pass a high school biology exam that tested their comprehension of the modern synthesis).

What people say they “believe” about climate change (at least if they are members of the general public in the US) is likewise an expression of who they are, not what they know.

That is, responses to recognizable climate-change survey items—“is it happening,” “are humans causing it,” “are we all going to die,” “what’s the risk on a scale of 0-10,” etc.— are all simply indicators of a latent cultural disposition. The disposition is easily enough measured with right-left political orientation measures, but cultural worldviews are even better and no doubt plenty of other things (even religiosity) work too.

There isn’t any general correlation—positive or negative—between how much people know either about science in general or about climate-science in particular and their “belief” in human-caused climate change.

Click me ... or Donald Trump will become President!But there is an interaction between their capacity for making sense of science and their cultural predispositions.  The greater a person’s proficiency in one or another science-related reasoning capacity (cognitive reflection, numeracy, etc.) the stronger the relationship between their cultural identity (“who they are”) and what they say they “believe” etc. about human-caused climate change.

Why? Presumably because people can be expected to avail themselves of all their mental acuity to form beliefs that reliably convey their membership in and commitment to the communities they depend on most for psychic and material support.

But if one wants to “unconfounded” identity-expressive from knowledge-evincing responses on climate change, one can use the same trick that one uses to accomplish this objective in measuring comprehension of evolutionary science.   OSI_1.0 added the clause “climate scientists believe” to its batery of true-false items on the causes and consequences of human-caused climate change. And lo and behold, individuals of opposing political orientations—and hence opposing “beliefs” about human-caused climate change—turned out to have essentially the equivalent understandings of what “climate science” knows.

Click me ... and Bernie will become President!In general, their understandings turned out to be abysmal: the vast majority of subjects—regardless of their political outlooks or beliefs on climate change—indicated that “climate scientists believe” that  human CO2 emissions stifle photosynthesis, that global warming will cause skin cancer, etc. 

Only individuals at the very highest levels of science comprehension (as measured by the Ordinary Science Intelligence assessment) consistently distinguished genuine from bogus assertions about the causes and consequences of climate change. Their responses were likewise free of the polarization--even though they are the people in whom there is the greatest political division on “belief in” human-caused climate change.


But in collecting data for OSI_2.0, we decided to measure exactly how much of an impact it makes in response to use the identity-knowledge “scientists believe” unconfounding device.

The impact is huge!

Here are a couple of examples of just how much a difference it makes:

Subjects of opposing political outlooks—and hence opposing “beliefs” about human-caused climate change--don't disagree about whether “human-caused global warming will result in flooding of many coastal regions” or whether “nuclear power generation contributes to global warming” when those true-false statements are introduced with the prefix “according to climate scientists” (obviously, the "nuclear" item is a lot harder--that is, people on average, regardless of political outlook, are about as likely to get it wrong as right; "flooding" is a piece of cake).

But when the prefix is removed, subjects of opposing outlooks answer the questions in an (incorrect) manner that evinces their identity-expressive views.  

That prefix is all it takes to toggle the switch between an “identity-expressive” and a “science-knowledge-evincing” orientation toward the items.

All it takes to show that for ordinary members of the public there are two climate changes: one on which their beliefs express “who they are” as members of opposing cultural groups; and another on which their beliefs reflect “what they know” as people who use their reason to acquire their (imperfect in many cases) comprehension of what science knows about the impact of human behavior on climate change.

Now what’s really cool about this pairing is the opposing identity-knowledge "valencess" of the items. The one on flooding shows how the “according to climate scientists" prefix unconfounds climate-science knowledge from a mistaken identity-expressive “belief” characteristic of a climate-skeptical cultural style.  The item on nuclear power, in contrast, uncounfounds  climate-science knowledge from a mistaken identity-expressive “belief” characteristic of a climate-concerned  style.

I like this because it answers the objection—one some people reasonably raised—that adding the “scientists believe” clause to OSI_1.0 items didn't truly elicit climate-science knowledge in right-leaning subjects.  The right-leaning subjects, the argument went, were attributing to climate scientists views that right-leaning subjects themselves think are contrary to scientific evidence but that they think climate scientists espouse becasuse climate scientists are so deceitful, misinformed etc.

I can certainly see why people might offer this explanation.

But it seems odd to me to think that right-leaning subjects would in that case make the same mistakes about climate scientists' positions (e.g., that global warming will cause skin cancer, and stifle photosynthesis) that left-leaning ones would; and even more strange that only right-leaning subjects of low to modest science comprehension would impute to climate scientists these comically misguided overstatements of risk, insofar as high science-comprehending, right-leaning subjects are the most climate skeptical & thus presumably most distrustful of "climate scientists."

Well, these data are even harder to square with this alternative account of why OSI_1.0 avoided eliciting politically polarized responses.

One could still say "well, conservatives just think climate scientsts are full of shit," of course, in response to the effect of removing the prefix for the “flooding” item.

But on the “nuclear power causes climate change” item, left-leaning subjects were the ones whose responses shifted strongly in the identity-expressive direction when the “according to climate scientists prefix” was removed.  Surely we aren’t supposed to think that left-leaning, climate-concerned subjects find climate scientists untrustworthy, corrupt etc. , too! 

The more plausible inference is that the “according to science prefix” does exactly what it is supposed to: unconfound climate-science knowledge and cultural identity, for everyone.

Thus, if one is culturally predisposed to give climate-skeptical answers to express identity, the prefix stifles incorrect "climate science comprehension" responses that evince climate skepticism—e.g., that climate change will cause flooding.

If one is culturally predisposed to give climate-concerned responses, in contrast, then the prefix stifles what would be the identity-expressive inclination to express incorrect beliefs about the contribution of human activities to climate change—e.g., that nuclear power is warming the planet.

The prefix turns everyone from who he or she is when processing information for identity protection into the person he or she is when induced to reveal whatever "science knowledge" he or she has acquired.

This inference is reinforced by considering how these responses interact with science comprehension. 

As can be seen, for the "prefix" versions of the items, individuals of both left- and right-leaning orientations are progressively more likely to give correct "climate science comprehension" answers as their OSI scores increase.  This makes a big difference on the “nuclear power” item, because it’s a lot harder than the “flooding” one.

Nevertheless, when the “prefix” is removed, those who are high in science comprehension (right-leaning or left-) are the most likely to get the wrong answer when the wrong answer is identity-expressive! 

That’s exactly what one would expect if the prefix were functioning to suppress an identity-expressive response, since those high in OSI are the most likely to form identity-expressive beliefs as a result of motivated reasoning.

Suppressing such a response, of course, is what the “according to scientists” clause is supposed to do as an identity/science-knowledge unconfounding device.

This result is exactly the opposite of what one would expect to see, though, under the alternative, “just measuring conservative distrust of/disagreement with climate scientists” explanation of the effect of the prefix: the subjects who such an explanation implies ought to be most likely to attribute an absurdly mistaken "climate concerned" position to climate scientists--the right-leaning subjects highest in science comprehension--were in fact the least likely to do so.

But it was definitely very informative to look more closely at this issue.

Indeed, how readily one can modify the nature of the information processing that subjects are engaging in—how easily one can switch off identity-expression and turn on knowledge-revealing—is pretty damn amazing.

Of course, this was done in the lab.  The million dollar question is how to do it in the political world so that we can rid our society once and for all of illiberal, degrading, welfare-annihilating consequences of the first climate change. . . .

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Reader Comments (59)

But from where I sit, part of the difficulty is in determining what to think when I see people disagreeing about the uncertainty and quality of the track record.

Need you come to a judgment? It's sort of a Zen question, I know, but I ask it in full seriousness. "The track record" isn't exactly a monolithic thing that has to be accepted, rejected, defended all at once. Depending on what you're trying to use any model for, it can be good enough or not. So disagreement is to be expected over whether good enough models exist and are accessible, because people have all sorts of different uses for the information. (That's just people saying "I want publicly funded scientists working on open-access models to be working on -my- problem!")

I can tell you about my own experience, for example. By no means is it normative.

In my previous role as an agricultural development activist, I actually had a good selection of models that made regional predictions available through the National Climate Change Viewer from which to argue about climate change adaptation. Could people be presumed to trust them? Not at all. Were their projections worth trusting? Difficult to say. The projections were often presented with inappropriate spatial granularity and without error bars. The folks at USGS tried to make it easy and transparent for people like me, and got part of the way there, but not as far as they needed to go in my opinion. In the end, when I presented this material to farmers, I chose to emphasize and characterize ongoing climate change, and presented both what we know from just extrapolating trends as well as what our models guess, if you were to trust the models.

Many actionable items come out of the trend extrapolation alone. Over 30 year horizon, Michigan should be thinking about an expanding tree nut industry, for instance. We also need to be prepared for the inevitable introduction of southern weeds that are new to the area. Over that same horizon, our water advantage vis-a-vis the rest of the United States also increases, and might become a selling point for the region as a whole and an argument for beginning to encourage farm agglomeration, especially in profitable specialty crops. The operational sustainabiilty of CAFOs is adversely affected under higher temperatures, which could eventually warrant the re-consideration of some livestock-related generally accepted ag management practices or the institution of new state standards.

How much would improved climate model precision actually help? In my view, probably little, compared to improving the economic uncertainties of -economic- models, with which the results of climate models necessarily interact to make any decent policy recommendations about economic development in the ag sector. I think if we applied half the rigor of climate modeling into the estimation of the multi-year economic effects of various types of government taxation and spending, we'd be a lot better off.

March 30, 2016 | Unregistered Commenterdypoon

dypoon -

==> The track record" isn't exactly a monolithic thing that has to be accepted, rejected, defended all at once. Depending on what you're trying to use any model for, it can be good enough or not.

Yes. That's pretty much what I think would match "responsible" usage of modeling. Unfortunately, we see instead a lot of irresponsible usage - which runs in either direction: (1) using models w/o sufficiently weighting their uncertainty or, (2) denigrating the models by virtue of the reality that all modeling is uncertain.

You know, all models are wrong but some are useful.

Underlying that reality is, for me at least, our very nature of being modelers, inherently: A key component of how we make sense of the world is through modeling (I'm tempted to say that we only make sense of the world through modeling, but want to leave room for differentiation creative or emotional understanding).

What is an 'agricultural development activist?" What are "CAFPs?"

==> In the end, when I presented this material to farmers, I chose to emphasize and characterize ongoing climate change, and presented both what we know from just extrapolating trends as well as what our models guess, if you were to trust the models.

Sounds like responsible use of modeling.

==> How much would improved climate model precision actually help? In my view, probably little, compared to improving the economic uncertainties of -economic- models,

Good luck with that one :-) (One of the more amusing aspects of the climate wars is that so much of the rhetoric I see from "skeptics," which fallaciously exploits the uncertainty of climate modeling, is rooted in a willful ignoring of the uncertainty of economic modeling - or indeed, the very modeling that underlies all of their own cognitive processing).

March 31, 2016 | Unregistered CommenterJoshua

"But in Central Valley CA, where many of the most profitable crops are tree crops, knowing if the water's going to be too expensive (and if the groundwater's going to be there) for the tree to be profitable when it matures is pretty important."

Good point. That's an example where longer-term information would be useful.

"I must disagree. The USDA Zones are defined on the basis of annual minimum temperature. In the past 20 years, basically everywhere within a 200 mile radius of where I live in the US Midwest has already moved up one Zone because of ongoing climate change. It changes how long the growing season is and what crops are possible to plant."

Don't confuse "anthropogenic climate change" with "climate change". The climate changes all the time like that, and always has.

Here's a fun historical quote:

A change in our climate however is taking place very sensibly. Both heats and colds are become much more moderate within the memory even of the middle-aged. Snows are less frequent and less deep. They do not often lie, below the mountains, more than one, two, or three days, and very rarely a week. They are remembered to have been formerly frequent, deep, and of long continuance. The elderly inform me the earth used to be covered with snow about three months in every year. The rivers, which then seldom failed to freeze over in the course of the winter, scarcely ever do so now. This change has produced an unfortunate fluctuation between heat and cold, in the spring of the year, which is very fatal to fruits. From the year 1741 to 1769, an interval of twenty-eight years, there was no instance of fruit killed by the frost in the neighbourhood of Monticello. An intense cold, produced by constant snows, kept the buds locked up till the sun could obtain, in the spring of the year, so fixed an ascendancy as to dissolve those snows, and protect the buds, during their development, from every danger of returning cold. The accumulated snows of the winter remaining to be dissolved all together in the spring, produced those over flowings of our rivers, so frequent then, and so rare now.

Sounds familiar? That was Thomas Jefferson, writing in 1785.

Here's another one. Shown are three sections from the Central England Temperature series. The vertical scale is degrees C, the horizontal scale is years. One is from about 1680, one from 1850, and the other is from the modern period. Can you tell which rising line is caused by AGW and which two are natural climate change?

The climate changes everywhere, all the time.

There's a fallacy called "confirming the consequent" that goes as follows:
A causes B
B is observed
Therefore A caused it.

The problem with the logic is that lots of other things might cause B, as well.

It's a particularly common fallacy in popular science, because of the story about confirming predictions. You form a hypothesis, you make predictions from it, you do the experiment, and then if the predictions turn out true, the hypothesis is confirmed. This is totally wrong! The way science works is by falsification: you form an exhaustive set of hypotheses, you make predictions from them which are all different and experimentally distinguishable, you perform the experiment, and you thereby eliminate all but one hypothesis when their predictions fail. The logic of science is:
A causes/implies B
B is observed to be false
Therefore A is false.

We know there are other potential causes of climate change. There was no CO2 back in 1785 to explain Jefferson's observations, or in 1680 to explain what happened in England. So you first have to understand all the other possible causes of long-term change, and then use observation to eliminate them all. And we cannot currently do that, because there is no climate model in existence that accurately reproduces the actual observed distribution of the weather/climate. They all get it wrong.

However, what they do predict is that the contribution of AGW is small. 0.03 C per year would give you 0.6 C over two decades.

"I tell the farmers I talk to that it's like their land is migrating south 10 miles per year to enjoy the weather, and it's taking their farms and them along for the ride."

At that rate, in a 100 years they'll be 1000 miles further south. I think that's about the size of the USA, which has a 30 C difference in average temperature between its northern and southern borders. Not what mainstream climate scientists predicted at all! Do you think it's going to continue at that rate? Would you want to bet on the next 20 years continuing the same trend?

"Which then goes back to how you define "correct.""

I define it as verified and validated. Verification means experimentally demonstrating that the model can reliably predict outcomes with a specified and documented accuracy. Validation means showing that this accuracy is sufficient for your purpose - e.g. to distinguish hypotheses, or to increase agricultural profits.

"Sure. But the noise and randomness exists regardless. Because that is relatively larger than the signal doesn't mean that you don't take into account the signal, and perhaps act accordingly."

OK. Consider the cooling effect of people painting their roofs white. By reducing the Earth's albedo, it clearly has a cooling effect, so there is a signal, but the magnitude is small enough that it will be swamped by the noise. Should I nevertheless take it into account, and what should I do about it if I do?

Signals can only be detected, and are only worth paying attention to, when they are reasonably large compared to the noise. (Not necessarily bigger than it, but at least some noticeable fraction of it.) AGW at present is only significant at a continental/decadal scale. Whether that will change in the future is yet to be seen.

"Of course. You don't put all your eggs in one basket. But you may distribute your eggs based on some measure of considering the probabilistic impact of anthropogenic climate change that increased the likelihood of some trends relative to others."

Right. But I'm suggesting that in the short term the distribution of eggs taking AGW into account is almost identical to the distribution you would use if you didn't.

March 31, 2016 | Unregistered CommenterNiV

Don't confuse "anthropogenic climate change" with "climate change". The climate changes all the time like that, and always has.

Where have I made any mention of anthropogenic climate change in this case? Nowhere, except when referencing the models which I explicitly put huge caveats around. Most of the time, and for all the recommendations, I'm just talking about -ongoing- climate change, i.e., what we have seen in the past 25-30 years from observing the range changes of small mammals and plants right here in Michigan. I did my very best to support the model-independent case with facts on the ground alone, no atmospheric science necessary. My point is that there are adaptations to climate change that make sense no matter whether you "believe in" anthropogenic climate change or not, and that we should start preparing for them now so that we don't let the opportunities pass us by (and in my judgment, the improved opportunities in the Midwest do outweigh the heightened risks here).

At that rate, in a 100 years they'll be 1000 miles further south. I think that's about the size of the USA, which has a 30 C difference in average temperature between its northern and southern borders. Not what mainstream climate scientists predicted at all! Do you think it's going to continue at that rate? Would you want to bet on the next 20 years continuing the same trend?

No, I don't think it's going to continue at that rate. After about 350 miles, that spatial approximation starts hitting the Appalachians, and then we have substantial elevation effects to deal with that confound that nice, neat spatial approximation. I wouldn't use that approximation past 30 years. But over the next 20 years, when a farm from Michigan would be covering the flat parts of Ohio? yes, it's good enough. Within a typical farmer's economic time horizon in this region, the 10-15 km/year approximation is definitely good enough. 10 miles/year is actually intentionally on the very high end of that, and I think all the farmers I've said that to have heard it and come to their decision, "Oh, that means I've got more pressing things to worry about." See what I mean about matching uncertainties to decision-relevant parameters?

What is an 'agricultural development activist?" What are "CAFPs?"

I consulted pro bono as a policy analyst for a county food policy council. As I wasn't paid and had no affiliation with the organization, my personal objective was to advocate for policies and regulations that promoted the economic development of the small farms/local food sector in our region. "Ag development activist" is just my own term for my activities.

CAFOs (my typo or yours?) are "confined animal-feeding operations". Such operations typically raise livestock at high density on commodity feeds, usually indoors, without putting them out to pasture. Obviously, that sort of environment puts physiological stresses on the animals that affect ranchers' returns on investment. The thermal stress is one of these.

March 31, 2016 | Unregistered Commenterdypoon

"My point is that there are adaptations to climate change that make sense no matter whether you "believe in" anthropogenic climate change or not,"

Agreed. That's my point.

Climate changes. It does so naturally. Farmers know that. Farmers certainly believe in natural climate change, but only a significantly smaller proportion believe in anthropogenic climate change. Buying meteorological information on current conditions and immediate weather forecasts does not imply an implicit belief in AGW, nor does AGW actually impact on those forecasts in the near term that most of those farmers are interested in.

Dan is arguing that because farmers buy meteorological services, and some of those services are provided by AGW-believing climate scientists, that therefore farmers believe in AGW, even when they say they don't for ideological conformity reasons. I don't consider the evidence sufficient. Nor do I think the farmers are wrong - even if we assume the mainstream AGW-believing climate science is correct, it doesn't impact on most of the decisions they need to make. AGW is a far slower effect than the other types of climate change they're interested in.

"I wouldn't use that approximation past 30 years. But over the next 20 years, when a farm from Michigan would be covering the flat parts of Ohio? yes, it's good enough. Within a typical farmer's economic time horizon in this region, the 10-15 km/year approximation is definitely good enough."

Your evidence? (I'm not suggesting you're wrong. I'm just interested.)

" and I think all the farmers I've said that to have heard it and come to their decision, "Oh, that means I've got more pressing things to worry about." See what I mean about matching uncertainties to decision-relevant parameters?"

Yes, that's what I'd expect. Thanks for the information.

March 31, 2016 | Unregistered CommenterNiV


1. I now think after modeling data that there is definitely a difference in how OSI scores influence liberals & conservatives in relation to how they answer in their respective id-threatening no-prefix versions: there is a slight upward trend toward right answer for liberals as OSI increase; there is a strong downward trend for conservs.

2. But the *difference* in slopes for OSI for prefix & no-prefix is still positive across the entire range of OSI; for liberals, the probability of getting the "right" answer as OSI increases goes up more steeply in the prefix than no-prefix condition. So at end of day -- or end of the distribution --one still sees that when the "correct" answer is identity-threatening, higher science comprhension continuously predicts for both "types" a greater likelihood of answering incorrectly a question they would have answered correctly in the "prefix" condition. That makes me think the difference in point (1) isn't particulary important.

3. A logistic regression can catch the flattening out of the influence of a predictor on the probability of a particular outcome, but won't capture a shift in direction if one is really there. I could try modeling the data w/ a polynomial regression & see if anything interesting happens at the tailends of the distribution. You posit that at some critical point on OSI well past the one at which we already have reason to characterize people as disposed to engage in conscious effortful processing the very highest scoring ones start to use enough conscious effortful processing to offset identity-proective cognition. So I guess you are envisioning a quadratic-- an upside down "U"-- right? But I'd be shocked if anyting turned up. The observations are too thin at that point in the distribution, I'm guessing, to make anysort of polynomial regression "fit better."

4. I've got data from lots of other datasets examining how the tendency to give identity-expressive responses increase in relation to one or another critical reasoning dispoosition. What about this, e.g.? Or this?

I guess you'd treat the raw data in the "motivated numeracy" study as reflecting what you have in mind? Actually, it's still true in that data that the *gap* between how likely subjects are to get the right answer is increasing more-or-less continuously in relation to increased numeracy.

5. In the end I think you are trying to claw identity-protective reasoning back into heuristic or System 1 information processing. You are saying, I think, "well, just need to push a bit furtther down the tail of critical reasoning to find out when people finally shake free of the kind of thoughtlessness that manifests itself in identity-protective reasoning..." Maybe. But it seems really weird to me that that point, if it exists, necessariy occurs past the one in the critical-reasoning distribution at which we know that people are highly resistant to heuristic biases--like confirmation bias, denominator neglect, the conjunction fallacy etc etc ; & weirder still that people you see as not sufficiently disosed to use conscious, effortful processing are *using* their superior proficiency in exactly that to to selectively credit & dsmiss identity-protective reasoning that less proficienty critical reasoners are too though*less* to discern.

But I think we now agree that toggling from "identity-protective" to "science-knowledge-revealing" is happening at least for this very large group of highly proficient reasoners-- the one whose use of their reason for that purpose is what accounts generally for the magnification of polarization associated with the cognitive dispositions & skills essential to science comprehension.

April 1, 2016 | Registered CommenterDan Kahan

@Joshua-- I think the @538 piece is absurd!

April 1, 2016 | Registered CommenterDan Kahan


Absurd. Interesting.

Care to explain more? Do you think that the caveats presented about the value of replication are absurd?

Is Gelman's "time reversal heuristic" absurd?

April 1, 2016 | Unregistered CommenterJoshua

Dan -

No explanation for your "absurd" characterization?

I thought the article was quite interesting. Of course, no one else is obliged to agree with me on that. But I have no clue how anyone could describe the article as "absurd," so I'm curious as to what your reasoning might be.

April 3, 2016 | Unregistered CommenterJoshua

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