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« Weekend update: does transparency help with this overplotting problem? | Main | How many talks did I give last yr? And how about yr before that, & yr before that ... »

Next stop (not counting weekly trips to Cambridge, MA) 

Northwestern University, Evansville, Ill., Nov. 14:


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Reader Comments (6)

Interesting angle on "motivated reasoning."

But there was no real difference between the patients, the researchers found. Those who got the sham procedure did just as well as those who got Stent.

I've also read that large scale studies show that sham meniscus surgery is equally effective to the most common orthopedic surgery - "real" meniscus "repair" surgery.

It would be interesting to know if/what attributes of doctors (or patients) may be associated with views on the outcomes of "real" vs. sham surgery.

Do those who think that being "smart" associates with being "better" at motivated reasoning, and that being "scientifically curious" mitigates that causal connection, also think that those mechanisms would come into play in doctors (and patients) forming beliefs about surgical procedures where outcomes are no better than sham surgeries?

November 3, 2017 | Unregistered CommenterJoshua

Interesting take on a weird result:
"People may be less willing to meaningfully consider belief inconsistent material if they feel that their beliefs are unlikely to change as a consequence" - yet their beliefs change more than they recall:

November 3, 2017 | Unregistered CommenterJonathan

@Jonathon-- I've always believed this, actually.

November 4, 2017 | Registered CommenterDan Kahan

Dan, you're a meta-humor one-trick pony.

November 4, 2017 | Unregistered CommenterJonathan

@Jonathan-- that's because I'm so used to people *mis*citing our studies as empirical evidence that "the other side" is biased in its interpretation of empirical evidence

November 5, 2017 | Registered CommenterDan Kahan

Posting this comment a bit late, but it's great you'll be stopping by Northwestern (my home institution)! I'm looking forward to your talk.

November 8, 2017 | Unregistered CommenterZach Hafen

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