Is ideologically motivated reasoning rational? And do only conservatives engage in it? - Cultural Cognition of Health

These were questions that I posed in a workshop I gave last Thurs. at Duke University in the political science department. I’ll give my (provisional, as always!) answers after “briefly” outlining the presentation (as I remember it at least). Slides here .

1. What is ideologically motivated reasoning?

It’s useful to start with a simple Bayesian model of information processing—not b/c it is necessarily either descriptively accurate (I’m sure it isn’t!) or normatively desirable (actually, I don’t get why it wouldn’t be, but seriously, I don’t want to get into that!) but b/c it supplies a heuristic benchmark in relation to which we can identify what is distinctive about any asserted cognitive dynamic.

Consider “confirmation bias” (CB) . In a simple Bayesian model, when an individual is exposed to new information or evidence relating to some factual proposition (say, that global warming is occurring; or that allowing concealed click me! possession of firearms decreases violent crime), she revises (“updates”) her prior estimation of the probability of that proposition in proportion to how much more consistent the new information is with that proposition being true than with it being false (“the likelihood ratio” of the new evidence). Her reasoning displays CB when instead of revising her prior estimate based on the weight of the evidence so understood, she selectively searches out and assigns weight to the evidence based on its consistency with her prior estimation. (In that case, the “likelihood ratio” is endogenous to her “priors.”)  If she does this, she’ll get stuck on an inaccurate estimation of the probability of the proposition despite being exposed to evidence that the estimate is wrong.

Motivated reasoning (MR) (at least as I prefer to think of it) refers to a tendency to engage information in a manner that promotes some goal or interest extrinsic to forming accurate beliefs. Thus, one searches out and selectively credits evidence based on the congeniality of it to that extrinsic goal or interest. Relative to the Bayesian model, then, we can see that goal or interest—rather than criteria related to accuracy of belief—as determining the “weight” (or likelihood ratio) to be assigned to new evidence related to some proposition.

MR might often look like CB . Individuals displaying MR will tend to form beliefs congenial to the extrinsic or motivating goal in question, and thereafter selectively seek out and credit information consistent with that goal. Because the motivating goal is determining both their priors and their information processing, it will appear as if they are assigning weight to information based on its consistency with their priors. But the relationship is in fact spurious (priors and likelihood ratio are not genuinely endogenous to one another).

“Ideologically motivated reasoning” (IMR), then, is simply MR in which some ideological disposition (say, “conservativism” or “liberalism”) supplies the motivating goal or interest extrinsic to formation of accurate beliefs.  Relative to a Bayesian model, then, individuals will search out information and selectively credit it conditional on its congeniality to their ideological dispositions. They will appear to be engaged in “confirmation bias” in favor of their ideological commitments. They will be divided on various factual propositions—because their motivating dispositions, their ideologies, are heterogeneous. And they will resist updating beliefs despite the availability of accurate information that ought to result in the convergence of their respective beliefs.

In other words, they will be persistently polarized on the status of policy relevant facts.

2. What is the cultural cognition of risk?

The cultural cognition of risk (CCR) is a form of motivated reasoning. It posits that individuals hold diverse predispositions with respect to risks and like facts.  Those predispositions—which can be characterized with reference to Mary Douglas’s “group grid” framework—motivate them to seek out and selectively credit information consistently with those predispositions. Thus, despite the availability of compelling scientific information, they end up in a state of persistent cultural polarization with respect to those facts.

The study of CCR is dedicated primarily to identifying the discrete psychological mechanisms through which this form of MR operates. These include “culturally biased information search and assimilation ”; “the cultural credibility heuristic ”; “cultural identity affirmation ”; and the “cultural availability heuristic .”

These mechanisms do not result in confirmation bias per se.  CCR, as a species of MR, describes the influences that connect information processing to an extrinsic motivating goal or interest. Often—maybe usually even—those influences will conform information processing to inferences consistent with a person’s priors, which will also reflect his or her motivating cultural predisposition. But CCR makes it possible to understand how individuals might be motivated to assess information about risk in a directionally biased fashion even when they have no meaningful priors (b/c, say, the risk in question is a novel one, like nanotechnology ) or in a manner contrary to their priors (b/c, say, the information, while contrary to an existing risk perception , is presented in an identity-affirming manner).

Recent research has focused on whether CCR is a form of heuristic-driven or “system 1” reasoning. The CCP Nature Climate Science study suggests that the answer is no . The measures of science comprehension in that study are associated with use of systematic or analytic “system 2” information processing. And the study found that as science comprehension increases, so does cultural polarization.

This conclusion supports what I call the “expressive rationality thesis.” The expressive rationality thesis holds that it CCR is rational at the individual level .

CCR is not necessarily conducive to formation of accurate beliefs under conditions in which opposing cultural groups are polarized.  But the “cost,” in effect, of persisting in a factually inaccurate view is zero; because an ordinary individual’s behavior—as, say, consumer or voter or participant in public debate—is too small to make a difference on climate change policy (let’s say), no action she takes on the basis of a mistaken belief about the facts will increase the risk she or anyone else she cares about faces.

The cost of forming a culturally deviant view on such a matter, however, is likely to be “high.” When positions on risk and like facts become akin to badges of membership in and loyalty to important affinity groups, forming the wrong ones can drive a wedge between individuals and others on whom they depend for support—material, emotional, and otherwise.

It therefore makes sense —is rational —for them to attend to information in issues like that (issues needn’t be that way; shouldn’t be allowed to become that way—but that’s another matter) in a manner that reliably aligns their beliefs with the ones that dominate in their group. One doesn’t have to have a science Ph.D. to do this. But if one does have a higher capacity to make sense of technical information, one can be expected to use that capacity to assure an even tighter fit between beliefs and identity—hence the magnification of cultural polarization as science comprehension grows.

3. Ideology, motivated reasoning & cognitive reflection

The “ Ideology, motivated reasoning & cognitive reflection” experiment ) (IMRCR) picks up at this point in the development of the project to understand CCR.  The Nature Climate Change study was observational (correlation), and while it identified patterns of risk perception more consistent with CCR than alternative theories (ones focusing on popular deficiencies in system 2 reasoning, in particular), the results were still compatible with dynamics other than “expressive rationality” as I’ve described it.  The IMRCR study uses experimental means to corroborate the “expressive rationality” interpretation of the Nature Climate Change study data.

It also does something else.  As we have been charting the mechanisms of CCR, other researchers and commentators have advanced an alternative IMR (ideologically motivated reasoning) position, which I’ve labeled the “ asymmetry thesis .” The asymmetry thesis attributes polarization over climate change and other risks and facts that admit of scientific investigation to the distinctive vulnerability of conservatives to IMR. Some (like Chris Mooney) believe the CCR results are consistent with IMR; I think they are not but that they really haven’t been aimed at testing the asymmetry thesis.