Key Insight
Note: This document is under construction. New terms will be added intermittently during periods in which there is nothing else to do or in which there is something else to do and hence an opportunity to engage in creative procrastination. Last updated: Nov. 3, 2018 Affect heuristic. Refers to the impact that affect (positive or negative feelings) ... Read more
Note: This document is under construction. New terms will be added intermittently during periods in which there is nothing else to do or in which there is something else to do and hence an opportunity to engage in creative procrastination.
Affect heuristic. Refers to the impact that affect (positive or negative feelings) have on information processing on risk. The cultural cognition thesis posits that cultural outlooks determine the valence of such feelings, which can be treated as mediating the impact of cultural worldviews on risk perceptions and related facts. [Sources: Slovic et al., Risk Analysis , 24, 311-322 (2004); Peters & Slovic, J. Applied Social Psy. , 16, 1427-1453 (1996); Peters, Burraston & Mertz, Risk Analysis , 18, 715-27 (1998); Poortinga & Pidgeon, Risk Analysis , 25, 199-209. Dated added: Jan. 7, 2018.]
Asymmetry vs. symmetry theses . Refers to competing positions on whether forms of cognitive proficiency subversive of unbiased processing of political information are concentrated more heavily among conservatives than among liberals (and hence “asymmetrically” across the left-right political spectrum). Discussed ad nausem in CCP blog. Proponents of one position or the other tend to ignore MS2R, which implies, paradoxically, that if there is an asymmetry in how open-mindedness and reflection are distributed along the left-right political spectrum, those who possess a higher degree of this trait are the most likely to evince politically motivated reasoning. [Added April 28, 2018.]
Bounded rationality thesis (“BRT”). Espoused most influentially by Daniel Kahneman, this theory identifies over-reliance on heuristic reasoning as the source of various observed deficiencies (the availability effect; probability neglect; hindsight bias; hyperbolic discounting; the sunk-cost fallacy, etc.) in human reasoning under conditions of uncertainty. Nevertheless, BRT does not appear to be the source of cultural polarization over societal risks. On the contrary, such polarization has in various studies been shown to be the greatest in the individuals most disposed to resist the errors associated with heuristic information processing . [Sources: Kahan, Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences (2016); Kahneman, American Economic Review, 93(5), 1449-1475 (2003); Kahneman & Frederick in Morrison (Ed.), The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning (pp. 267-293), Cambridge University Press. (2005); Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, A., Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases , Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press (1982). Added Jan. 12, 2018]
Thus a science-trained professional might “believe in” human evolution when he or she is engaged in professional tasks that depend on the truth of that theory, yet still disbelieve in human evolution when he or she is acting as a member of a religious community, in which such disbelief enables her to experience and signal membership in and loyalty to such a community. Farmers, too , have been observed to “disbelieve in” human-caused climate change when acting as members of their cultural communities, but to “believe in it” when endorsing farming practices that anticipate human-caused climate change. [Sources: Everhart & Hameed, Evolution: Education and Outreach, 6 (1), 1-8 (2013); Prokopy, Morton et al., Climatic Change, 117, 943-50 (2014); Cultural cognition blog passim . Added: Jan. 4 2018].
Cognitive illiberalism. Refers to a tendency to selectively impute cognizable secular harms to behavior that generates non-cognizable sectarian harms . Such a tendency is unconscious and hence invisible to the actor whose information-processing capabilities have been infected by it. Indeed, the bias that cognitive illiberalism comprises can subvert a decisionmaker’s conscious, genuine intent to exercise legal authority consistent with liberal ideals. Featured in NY Times Magazine’s “Year in Ideas,” 1999. [source: Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, Harv. L. Rev. (2009), 126, 837-906; Kahan, Hoffman, Braman, Evans & Rachlinski, Stan. L. Rev., 64, 851-906 (2012). Added Dec. 26, 2017.]
Cognitive Reflection Test (“CRT”) . A three-item assessment of the capacity and disposition to override judments founded on intuition. Regarded as the best meausure of a person’s propensity to overrely on heuristic, System 1 information processing as opposed to conscious, analytical System 2 information processing. [Frederick, S. (2005), 19, J. Econ. Persp. ; Kahneman & Frederick (2005), in The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning (pp. 267-293). Dated added: Feb. 7, 2018.]
Cognitively illiberal state. Refers t o a liberal political regime pervaded—and hence subverted—by institutions and laws that reflect the unconscious tendency of legal and political decisionmakers to impute secular harms to behavior that imposes only sectarian ones . [source: Kahan, Stanford L. Rev. 60, 115-64 (2007). Added Dec. 26, 2017.]
Conflict entrepreneurs. Individuals or groups that profit from filling public discourse with antagonistic memes, thereby entangling diverse cultural identities with opposing positions on some science issue. The benefit conflict entrepreneurs derive—greater monetary contributions to the advocacy groups they head; the opportunity to collect large speaking fees; remunerative deals for popular books; high status within their cultural communities—doesn’t depend on whether their behavior genuinely promotes the cause they purport to be advancing. On the contrary, they profit most in an atmosphere pervaded by cultural recrimination and contempt, one in which democratic convergence on valid science is decidedly unlikely to occur. Their conduct contributes to that state. [Source: Kahan, Scheufele & Jamieson, Oxford Handbook on the Science of Science Communication, Introduction (2017); Kahan, Jamieson et al. J. Risk Res., 20, 1-40 (2017) Cultural Cognition blog, passim. Dated added: Jan. 7, 2018.]
Cross-cultural cultural cognition (“C 4 ”) . Describes the use of the Cultural Cognition Worldview Scales to assess risk perceptions outside of the U.S. So far, the scales have been used in at least five nations other nations (England, Switzerland, Australia, Norway and Slovakia). [CCP Bog, passim . Added Jan. 12, 2018.]
Cultural Cognition Project (“CCP”) . A group of scholars interested in studying how cultural values shape public risk perceptions and related policy beliefs. Project members use the methods of various disciplines — including social psychology, anthropology, communications, and political science — to chart the impact of values on risk perceptions and to identify the mechanisms through which this effect operates. [source: CCP internet site . Added Jan. 6, 2018.]
Cultural cognition thesis . The conjecture that culture is prior to fact in debates over contested societal risks and related facts. Culture is prior not just in the normative sense that cultural values guide action conditional on beliefs about states of affairs; it is also prior in the positive sense that cultural commitments, through a variety of mechanisms, shape what individuals believe the relevant facts to be. [source: Kahan, Slovic, Braman & Gastil, Harvard Law Review 119, 1071-1109 (2006), p. 1083; dated added Dec. 23, 2017].
Cultural Cognition Worldview scales . Scales that reflect two continuous, cross-cutting preferences—“hierarchy” versus “egalitarianism,” and “individualism” versus “communitarianism”—for the ordering of social relations. The combination of orientations formed by the intersection of the scales are archetypes of the group affinities that inform the cultural cognition thesis. As such, the scales enable measurement of the predictions associated with the cultural cognition thesis [Source: Kahan in Handbook of Risk Theory: Epistemology, Decision Theory, Ethics and Social Implications of Risk, Hillerbrand et al. eds. , 325-60 (2012). Added: Jan. 15, 2018.]
Disentanglement principle. Shorthand for a normative practice, derived from empirical findings, that supports the self-conscious presentation of scientific information in a manner that effectively severs diverse cultural identities from positions on contested science issues. The effective use of the disentanglement principle has been credited with the successful teaching of evolutionary theory to secondary school students. It also is the basis for science communication in Southeast Florida, where community engagement with climate change science draws together groups and communities that hold opposing beliefs in human-caused climate change. [Sources: Lawson & Worsnop, Journal of Research in Science Teaching , 29, 143-66 (1992). Kahan, Advances in Pol. Psych. , 36, 1-43. Added on Jan. 4, 2016.]
Dual process theory/theories. A set of decisionmaking frameworks that posit two discrete modes of information processing: one (often referred to as “System 1”) that is rapid, intuitive, and emotion pervaded; and another (often referred to as “System 2”) that is deliberate, self-conscious, and analytical. [Sources: Kahan, Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences (2016); Kahneman, American Economic Review, 93(5), 1449-1475 (2003); Kahneman & Frederick in Morrison (Ed.), The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning (pp. 267-293), Cambridge University Press. (2005); Stanovich & West , Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23 (5), 645-665 (2000). Added Jan. 12, 2018.]
Expressive rationality . Refers to the tendency of individuals to (unconsciously) engage in the forms of information processing that signify their membership in, and loyalty to, important, identity-defining affinity groups. Among opposing groups, expressive rationality does not produce convergence but rather political polarization on the best available scientific evidence. Despite the harm it causes, this form of reasoning has been found to intensify rather than disippate as the public attain greater proficiency in critical reasoning skills recognized as the most essential for making sense of scientific evidence (e.g., Sources cognitive reflection, actively open-minded thinking, and numeracy . [Sources: Kahan, Peters, et al., Nature Climate Change , 2, 732-35, p. 734 (2012); Kahan, Behavioral & Brain Sci . 40,26-28 (2016); Stanovich, Thinking & Reasoning , 19, 1-26 (2013). Added Dec. 27, 2017.].
From mouth of the scientist to ear of the citizen. A fallacious view that treats the words scientists utter as a causal influence on formation and reform of public opinion on controversial forms of science. The better view recognizes that what science knows is transmitted from scientists to the public via the influence of dense, overlapping networks of intermediaries, which include not just the media but (more decisively) individuals’ peers, whose words & actions vouch for the science (or not) through their own use (or non-use) of scientific insights. Where there is a science communication problem, then, the source of it is the corruption of these intermediary networks, not any problem with how scienitsts themselves talk. [Source: Kahan, Oxford Handbook of the Science of Science Communication , eds. K.H. Jamieson, D.M. Kahan & D.Scheufele. Added: Jan. 19, 2018.]
Identity-protective reasoning. The tendency of individuals to selectively credit and dismiss factual assertions in a manner that reflects and reinforces their cultural commitments, thereby expressing affective orientations that secure their own status within cultural groups. [source: Kahan, Slovic et al., J. Empirical Legal Studies , 4, 465-505 (2007); added Dec. 23, 2017]
Industrial strength risk perception measure (“ISRPM”). A seven- or ten-point Likert measure that assesses respondents’ perception of the degree of risk an activity or state of affairs poses to society. At least where respondents have some degree of familiarity with the putative risk source, the ISRPM will tend to correlate very strongly ( r ≈ 0.8) with any more specific factual evaluation of the risk source. This property of the ISRPM, which likely reflects the item’s discernment of respondents’ affective orientation, makes it valid (and economical) to use the ISRPM alone to measure public risk perceptions. [Sources: Kahan, Advances in Pol. Psych. 36, 1-43 (2007); Cultural Cognition blog passim . Added: Jan. 12, 2018.]
Knowledge deficit. A theory (either explicit or implicit, conscious or unconscious) that treats simple unfamiliarity with facts as the cause of the public’s failure to converge on the best available scientific evidence on human-caused climate change, human evolution, the safety of nuclear power generation, etc. The theory also assumes (explicitly or implicitly, consciously or unconsciously) that simple communication of the best available evidence will dispel public conflict over facts. [added Dec. 19, 2017]